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Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the Continuum
*
A G J  Newstead
1 Introduction: Mathematical and Physical Continua
The mathematical structure of the continuum,  in the guise of the 
domain  of continuous,  differentiable  functions,  has  proved  im-
mensely useful in the study of nature. However, we have learned  
to be sceptical of any claim to the effect that our current favourite 
mathematical theory necessarily describes the actual structure  of 
the  physical  universe.  The  continuous  manifold  of space-time 
may be no more than  a helpful idealisation, when  in fact space-
time has a minutely  grainy  or quantised  structure. Nonetheless, 
the question  of whether  the classical continuum  is an  accurate 
representation of the structure of space-time is a separate question 
from the one which we have to answer today. We are interested in 
the mathematical concept of the continuum  itself.
In saying that we may develop  a mathematical theory of the 
continuum  regardless of whether such a continuum  is actually to 
be found in the universe, we are relying on the premise that there 
is such a thing as pure mathematics, a body  of knowledge  whose 
evidential basis rests on something  other than observation of the 
physical world.  Consider,  for example, the proposition  that  the 
tangent to a point P on a circle’s circumference is perpendicular to 
the radius connecting P and the centre of the circle. As a proposi-
tion of pure  mathematics, this proposition  is true independently 
of whether there really are entities in the physical world that meet 
the mathematical definition of a circle, namely, that of a figure all 2 A G J  Newstead
of whose points are equidistant from a given point. Similarly, the 
proposition  that the continuum  is infinitely divisible is true as a 
proposition about the purely mathematical continuum  regardless 
of whether there are continua perfectly instantiated in the physic-
al world.
This way of dividing mathematics into pure and applied, with 
its concomitant  separation  of the subject matter  of mathematics 
from physics, is quite foreign to Aristotle’s way of thinking about 
mathematics.
1 In his view, the mathematician  and  the physicist, 
are both interested  in the properties of natural bodies  (τα φυσικa 
σώματα), but  they  differ  in their  emphasis.  The mathematician 
studies the properties of natural bodies, which include their sur-
faces and volumes, lines, and points (Phys. 193b 23-5, Waterfield).
2 
The mathematician  is not interested  in ‘the properties of natural 
bodies  as the  properties  of natural  bodies,’ as the  physicist  is 
(Phys. 193b33-4, Waterfield). Instead, the mathematician  is inter-
ested  in the  properties  of natural  bodies  that  are ‘separable  in 
thought from the world of change’ (χωριστα γaρ τh νοήσει κινήσεώς 
eστι) (Phys. 193b33, Waterfield). But, Aristotle assures us, the pro-
cedure  of separating  these properties in thought  from the world 
of change does not make any difference or result in any falsehood 
(Phys.193a36). Aristotle’s philosophy  of mathematics  is rightly 
classified   as  abstractionist,   because   abstraction   (separation   in 
thought) is the process whereby Aristotle’s mathematician comes 
up  with his subject matter, having  started  with bodies and  their 
properties in the natural world.
3
An  apparent implication of Aristotle’s description  of mathem-
atical properties at Physics 193b34-5 as those that are separable in 
thought  from  motion  is that  the  mathematician  cannot  study 
properties pertaining to the motion of bodies. But motion is con-
tinuous, and  continuity  would  seem to be an inextricably math-
ematical notion insofar as it involves the idea of the infinite divis-
ibility of magnitude. So the implication cannot be what Aristotle 
intended. Rather, then, it must be the case that both the physicist 
and mathematician study  continuity, the one as it pertains to the 
actual movements  of particular  bodies, and  the other  insofar as 
the  general  property  can  be abstracted  from  the  trajectories  of 
moving bodies. The continuity of a trajectory in space can be con-
sidered  independently of the body that traces out that trajectory, 
since any other body of the same size moving continuously along Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
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the same path would exemplify the same mathematical property.
4 
A further  level of abstraction occurs if we take the body  to be a 
point-mass,   and   disregard   the   width   of   its   path   entirely. 
Moreover, when studying the continuum,  it really doesn’t matter 
if you take the continuous, regular motion of one body or another: 
the mathematical property  of continuity is the same everywhere 
and always. That is why Aristotle is fond of saying that mathem-
atical items are not at all like the notion of snub-nosedness, since 
unlike the latter notion, they  can be conceived  of apart  from the 
particular  material  substances  in which  they  happen  to inhere 
(e.g. Phys. 194a6; Meta. 1025b30-1026a1).
An advantage of reading Aristotle as an abstractionist is that it 
encourages us to look to Aristotle’s remarks on physical continua 
in order to recover his mathematical theory of continuity. An in-
vestigation  respecting  this  principle  of interpretation  has  been 
given  by Michael White in his excellent article, “On Continuity: 
Aristotle versus Topology.”
5 I think he has been quite persuasive 
in showing  that Aristotle has a ‘proto-topological’ conception  of 
the  continuum  that  overlaps  to a considerable  extent  with  the 
classical modern account. In this essay, I develop this claim in fur-
ther detail with special reference to Georg Cantor (1845-1918), the 
creator of set theory, transfinite numbers, and point set topology. 
The rationale  for undertaking  such  a comparison  stems  largely 
from  Cantor’s numerous  references  to Aristotle, which  suggest 
that, in Cantor’s view, Aristotle’s denial of the actual infinite posed 
the single greatest obstacle towards the acceptance of his transfin-
ite number  theory.
6 In fact the relation  between  Aristotelianism 
and modern Cantorian mathematics is more complicated, and this 
is particularly evident in the case of the continuum.
There  are  significant  dangers  in   comparing  the   views  of 
thinkers from such different time periods, and so in section II, as a 
guard against anachronism, I sketch some of the major differences 
between  the state of mathematics, particularly in the conception 
of real quantities, in ancient and  modern  times. In section III, to 
further motivate the comparison  between  Aristotle and  Cantor, I 
present some evidence, primarily from Cantor’s letters, which re-
veals  Cantor’s  attitude  towards  Aristotle’s  theory  of the  con-
tinuum. In section IV, I argue that of the three features that Cantor 
uses   to   define   the   continuum   (density,   connectedness   and 
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ory  of the  continuum,  and  includes  the  third  when  discussing 
time and  change. In Section  V, I give a reconstruction  of Aris-
totle’s argument against constituting the continuum  out of points, 
claiming that this conclusion can be derived from intuitions about 
the impossibility of giving a rule for ordering the densely arrayed 
points of a continuum.  Although  this ‘reconstruction’ is broadly 
Aristotelian  in spirit, I do not claim, however, that it represents 
what Aristotle actually thought about this matter: it is a reconcep-
tion   of   the   Aristotelian   argument   from   a   modern   (and   un-
abashedly  classical realist) perspective. Finally, I leave it to the 
reader to judge whether such agreement as can be found between 
such opposed  thinkers  as Cantor  and  Aristotle lends  some sup-
port to a crucial premise from Aristotle’s philosophy  of mathem-
atics: the claim that mathematical structures begin as abstractions 
from the behaviour and properties of physical objects.
2 An Apology to Historians
The demands  of good history and creative philosophical thinking 
are not always in harmony. While some philosophers  are happy  
to suppose  that  there is a logical space of eternal philosophical 
problems, and delight in tracing the development  of ‘a unit idea’ 
through successive periods, many historians and historically sens-
itive philosophers  would  reject such a method  as anachronistic.
7 
As a guard  against  such  anachronism,  before  proceeding  to  a 
comparison  of the similarities between  their views in section III 
and IV, I shall outline a few of the significant differences between 
Aristotle’s   and   Cantor’s   views   of   mathematics.   I   am   aware, 
however, of not being able to do justice to the intricacies of such a 
discussion.
The first major obstacle to carrying out a comparison between 
Aristotle and Cantor is that Aristotle does not have a concept of a 
real number  per se, a concept  central to the modern  arithmetical 
account of the continuum.  It is easy to overestimate this obstacle 
in light of the fact that the extension of Aristotle’s concept of num -
ber (aριθμος) is unambiguously restricted to the domain of whole 
numbers.  Aristotle speaks  of number  as a multitude  of indivis-
ibles (πλhθος αδιαιρετwν) (Meta. 1085b22), and as several ones ( να 
πλείω) (Phys. 207b5-9). It is clear that, as the one is indivisible (τ  ν  Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
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στιν  διαίρετον) (Phys. 207b6) these two  descriptions  are co-ex-
tensive. It is clear, moreover, from Categories 4b25ff. that Aristotle 
views the division between number and magnitude to map neatly 
onto an exclusive division between  the discrete and  the continu-
ous. Number is said to be discrete, because its parts do not share 
any boundary, whereas sharing  a boundary  is one of Aristotle’s 
criteria for the continuity of one item with another (see also Phys. 
227a7ff.). Lines are  continuous,  in contrast,  because  each  point 
may be regarded  as a boundary  shared between segments. Given 
this conception  of number  as discrete, and  given the notion that 
the parts  of number  are ‘ones,’ it would  be natural  to conclude 
that Aristotle thinks of numbers as whole numbers that are com-
posed  of a certain  number  of ones. The interpretation  of these 
‘ones’ is a matter of some dispute. Aristotle’s remarks at Physics 
224a2ff, however, suggest  very much  that he conceives of num-
bers  as concrete  collections,  since  he  claims  that  although  ten 
sheep  and  ten dogs  are equinumerous,  these collections  do  not 
constitute the very same (number) ten. If this view is representat-
ive, then Aristotelian ones must be concrete individuals of a cer-
tain kind. Assuming  the kind  of individuals  that may  serves as 
‘ones’ exclude  individual  lengths  or magnitudes,  then  it follows 
that any collection of ‘ones’ must be a whole number (or positive 
natural number). So fractions as well as irrational quantities are 
not numbers  for Aristotle. Confirmation  that  irrationals are not 
numbers for Aristotle is found  in his remark that “the relation of 
that which exceeds to that which is exceeded  is numerically quite 
indefinite; for number  is always commensurable; and  number  is 
not said of the non-commensurable” (Meta. 1021a5, Ross).
Such remarks aside, Aristotle is perfectly aware that there are 
magnitudes which cannot be expressed as the ratio of whole num-
bers, these  are   λογοι μέγεθοι, or incommensurable  magnitudes 
( συμμετροί μέγεθοι) which he mentions numerous  times in vari-
ous  works,  (see especially  Meta. 983a13-20; An.  Pr. 41a29), and 
which  he  would  have  been  aware  of from  discussions  at  the 
Academy.
8  Almost  without  exception,  Aristotle gives  as an  ex-
ample  of an  incommensurable  magnitude,  the  length  d  of a 
square’s diagonal, which is incommensurable with the length l of 
one of its sides precisely in the sense that there is no whole num-
ber n such that n times l is exactly equal to m times d.6 A G J  Newstead
The reader  should  not be given the impression  that the irra-
tionals were somehow  intractable entities for the ancient Greeks. 
In Book 5 of Euclid’s Elements, there is a completely general the-
ory of proportions between magnitudes, applicable to incommen-
surable and commensurable magnitudes alike. Eudoxus of Cnidos 
(ca. 408 BC -ca. 347 BC) is credited with developing this theory of 
proportion, and I shall follow the general practice by referring to 
it as the Eudoxean  theory.
9 The core of the Eudoxean  theory  is 
found  in definitions  4 and  5. According  to definition  4, ‘Mag-
nitudes  are said  to have a ratio towards  one another  which  are 
capable, when  multiplied  of exceeding  each other.’
10 So a and  b 
have a ratio just in case there are whole numbers n, m such that 
an > b and bm >a.
Since n and m are finite, this definition rules out the possibil-
ity that a or b might be infinitesimal or infinite, since multiplying 
either  type  of quantity  by a finite number  does not increase its 
size. However, the definition does not exclude the possibility that 
a or b might be incommensurables. Definition 5 gives the condi-
tion for when  magnitudes  are said  to be in the same  ratio.
11 In 
modern  notation, definition 5 states that for any magnitudes a, b, 
c, and  d, the two  ratios a:b and  c:d are equal  if for any  whole 
numbers n and m, one of the following cases obtains:
(1) if na < mb, then nc < md
(2) if na=mb, then nc=md,
(3) if na > mb, then nc > md.
In case (2), a/b  =m/n,  and since m and n are whole numbers, a/b  
is commensurable. Cases (1) and (3) provide for the situations in 
which a/b  < m/n  and  a/b  > m/n.  If m and  n range over all the 
whole numbers, this means that a/b  is incommensurable, that is, 
there are no whole numbers m and n such that a/b=m/n.
Many  modern  authors  have been struck  by the resemblance 
between  Eudoxus’ theory  and  the notion  of a Dedekind  cut. A 
Dedekind  cut partitions the rational numbers into two (mutually 
exclusive, non-empty) classes A and B, such that every member of 
A precedes every member of B, and such that the union of A and 
B is equal  to the set of all rational  numbers.  Dedekind  showed  
that, in the case where A has no greatest member  and  B has no 
least member, there will be a gap in the rational numbers. An irra-Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
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tional number may therefore be posited to correspond  to this gap. 
Eudoxus’ theory is similar, except that instead  of partitioning ra-
tional  numbers  into  two  classes,  he  partitions  ratios  of mag-
nitudes into three classes, with the second class encompassing the 
case where the ratio is commensurable. If we let A stand  for the 
ratio of any given quantities a:b, and let m and n be whole num-
bers as before, then  we have  three  classes of quantities, corres-
ponding to the cases where A < m/n,  A=m/n,  and A> m/n.  In or-
der to make this move, however, we have to treat the ratio a:b as a 
single item, and  it is therefore natural (for us) to conceptualise it 
as a number. It is not clear, however, whether Euclid (and so far 
as we  can tell Eudoxus)  would  have  considered  such  ratios as 
numbers, however, since the theory of proportions is stated twice, 
once for magnitudes  (Book 5, definition 5) and once for numbers 
(Book 7, definition 20). But one might say that the ratios are impli-
citly treated like (real) numbers insofar as many quasi-arithmetic-
al operations are performed  on them (e.g. inversion, composition, 
separation, and conversion, Book 5, definitions, 13-16).
12
Commentators  disagree  about  significance  of the  Eudoxean 
theory of ratios in answering the question of whether the ancient 
Greeks can be said  to have anything  like the modern  theory  of 
real numbers. Heath shows the equivalence of claims of sameness 
of Eudoxean  ratio with  sameness of real numbers  as defined  by 
Dedekind  cuts.
13 Bostock (1979) shows that if we introduce arith-
metical operations  on Eudoxean  ratios, we can derive  the same 
results in geometry that we would  now state using real numbers. 
Finally, Stein (1995) shows that there is a one to one mapping  of 
Eudoxean  ratios onto the set of positive real numbers as defined 
by Dedekind  cuts. In light  of these results  it seems  undeniable 
that the the Eudoxean  theory of ratios can act as a surrogate for 
the theory of real numbers, but it does not follow, in my opinion, 
that the ancient Greeks had the theory of real numbers. The reas-
on why is broadly Fregean: the fact that one theory T is co-extens-
ive with some other theory T,’ does not suffice to show that T and 
T’ are conceptually equivalent. Indeed, the Eudoxean  theory and 
the modern  theory could  not possibly be conceptually the same, 
since it is clear that statements involving magnitudes  have a dif-
ferent   sense   from   statements   involving   numbers.   Statements 
about  lengths  of a square  do  not have  the same  sense as state-
ments about real numbers. Statements stated in terms of ratios of 8 A G J  Newstead
lengths  and  their  ratios have  a different  sense from  statements 
stated in terms of real numbers. The multiplication of two lengths 
would  have immediately called to mind  in the Greek geometer a 
rectangle with  a certain  area, whereas  the multiplication  of two 
real numbers (for us) simply results in another real number.
14
Since Eudoxus spent time at Plato’s Academy, it would not be 
implausible to suppose  that  his ideas reached  Aristotle through 
the teachings  of the Academy.
15 In a remarkable  passage  in the 
Posterior Analytics, Aristotle says that whereas the demonstration 
that proportionals alternate used to be carried out separately with 
respect  to magnitudes  and  with  respect  to number,  ‘now  it is 
proved  universally’ (An. Post. 74a18-25). Aristotle seems  on the 
cusp of recognising that the Eudoxean theory of ratios might ap-
ply to numbers as well as magnitudes, but ultimately must disap-
point modern  readers in insisting on a strict separation  between 
the subject matter of geometry and arithmetic. He fleetingly enter-
tains  the  proposition  that  magnitudes  might  be numbers  (An. 
Post. 75b5), but only in the context of a contrary to fact hypothetic-
al. He uses the possibility that magnitudes  might be numbers to 
rebut the idea that one could give a purely arithmetical proof of a 
geometric  proposition.  It is clear  from  the  proceeding  remarks 
(An.  Pos.t  75a38), that  Aristotle  does  not  think  one  can  give  a 
purely  arithmetical  proof  of a geometrical  proposition.  Such  a 
proof would  violate his principle of the homogeneity of explana-
tion: the premises of a proof, its axioms, and its conclusion, must 
refer only to things which belong to the same genus. So, if these 
remarks  are right, then  Aristotle is sceptical for methodological 
reasons about  the very possibility of arithmetising  the theory  of 
continuous  quantities. A different attitude  towards  the arithmet-
isation  of mathematics, then, constitutes  a significant  difference 
between Aristotle and Cantor.
Cantor’s definition  of the irrationals as equivalence sequents 
of convergent  sequences  of rational  numbers  (in Cantor  (1872)) 
was part of a push to arithmetise analysis, a goal which he shared 
with his contemporaries Dedekind and Weierstrass.
16 The goal be-
hind arithmetisation was to increase the rigour of mathematics by 
eliminating, if possible, the reliance on geometrical intuition. Geo-
metrical intuition had shown itself to be fallible and even mislead-
ing; it carried  with  it prejudices that  prevented  mathematicians 
from seeing certain possibilities, such as: the existence of continu-Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
Continuum* 9
ous but nowhere  differentiable functions, the equinumerosity  of 
the points on a line with those in a plane, and the possibility of al-
ternative,   non-Euclidean   geometries.
17  Not   surprisingly,   then, 
both Dedekind  and Cantor reversed  the priority of geometry and 
arithmetic, preferring  to account  for the continuity  of a line in 
terms  of properties  of the  real  numbers  corresponding  to  the 
points on the line. Such a perspective transformed  the notion of 
the continuity of a line from an empirical postulate into a stipula-
tion about a mathematical space.
Cantor went so far as to proclaim the hypothesis of the con-
tinuity  of space to be none other than  an  arbitrary, conventional 
assumption of a complete one to one correspondence between the 
three dimensional purely arithmetical continuum  consisting of the 
ordered  triples (x,y,z) of real numbers and the space of the world 
of appearances (Erscheinungswelt).
18 He offered a mathematical ar-
gument for the independence of the mathematical structure of the 
continuum  from that of space which consisted of a proof that con-
tinuous  motion  is possible through  a discontinuous  (not every-
where  connected) space. He did  this by showing  that, even  if a 
countably infinite dense subset M is removed  from a continuous 
space A of two or more dimensions, it is possible to draw  a con-
tinuous  path  connecting  any  two  points  in A, without  crossing 
over any gaps in A.
19
The argument  by Cantor to the effect that there can be no dir-
ect inference from the appearance of motion to the structure of the 
underlying space would seem to undermine Aristotle’s claim that 
“Magnitude, time, and  movement  are all liable to the same reas-
oning. Either they all consist of indivisible components and are di-
visible into indivisibles, or none of them  does” (Phys. 232a23ff.). 
Since a continuum  is “that which is divisible into parts which are 
always further divisible” (Phys. 232b25), Aristotle is claiming that 
either space, time, and motion are all continuous or none of them 
are. Following Fred Miller’s terminology, we may call this claim 
‘the isomorphism  thesis,’ since it asserts  that  the  structures  of 
space, time, and motion are isomorphic.
20 In Cantor’s example, we 
have continuous motion in a not-everywhere continuous space, so 
that not all spaces and motions are isomorphic. Nonetheless, it re-
mains true for Cantor as for Aristotle, that any segment of a con-
tinuum  is isomorphic to any other. This claim is true in a technical 
sense  for Cantor,  since it is possible  to map,  in an  order  pre-10 A G J  Newstead
serving fashion, any segment of the reals onto any other segment. 
For Aristotle, the claim is true in the non-technical sense that any 
part of a continuum  is a continuum.  A further philosophical dif-
ference is that Cantor does not take claims about the mathematical 
structure of the continuum  to follow from the apprehension of the 
physically extended  world.  That is why  Cantor  could  view  the 
thesis  that  space  is continuous  as arbitrary.  But a philosopher 
sensitive  to contemporary  physics could  not  possibly  view  the 
claim as arbitrary. As noted at the outset, our best physical theor-
ies do assume that space and time are continuous.
21
In departing  from  Aristotle’s view  that  mathematical  struc-
tures  are  merely  abstracted  aspects  of physical  processes  and 
things, Cantor freed himself from the constraint that the mathem -
atical structure of space must mirror that of the space in which we 
live and move. As Cantor was well aware, Aristotle drew his con-
clusions about the nature of the (mathematical) continuum  from a 
consideration of physical continua.
22 This imposed  a considerable 
constraint on the freedom of the mathematician. If the abstraction-
ist interpretation  of Aristotle’s philosophy  of mathematics is cor-
rect, then for Aristotle there could be no such thing as a mathem -
atical continuum  with  peculiar  mathematical features not already 
found  in the physical continuum.  The isomorphism  thesis, then, 
would  follow  from  Aristotle’s philosophy  of mathematics.  Al-
though it would also be consistent with the isomorphism thesis to 
claim that space, time, and motion are all discontinuous, Aristotle 
does not do  so, because  he takes the continuity  of motion  as a 
datum of perception.
23 Despite the wealth of evidence suggesting 
that  Aristotle  was  concerned  with  the  physical  continuum,  it 
would  be  a  mistake,  given  either  interpretation  of Aristotle’s 
philosophy  of mathematics, to suppose that he is concerned  with 
the  physical  continuum  to the  exclusion  of the  mathematical.
24 
The exhaustive opposition between the physical and the mathem-
atical simply has no place in Aristotle’s anti-Platonist philosophy 
of mathematics.
3 Cantor as a Critic of Aristotle
Most of what Cantor has to say about philosophers who reject his 
actually infinite numbers is negative, and in this respect, Aristotle Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
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is no exception. In the Grundlagen, Cantor locates Aristotle at the 
head of a tradition against the actual infinite based on what he re-
gards as a mistaken  assumption, the assumption  that only finite 
numbers  can  be  counted.  In  contrast,  Cantor  thinks  that  by 
providing a hierarchy of transfinite numbers ordered according to 
size, he has shown  that there are infinities that can be counted  in 
the extended  sense of coming  in a certain order  in a sequence.
25 
Even as a metaphysical argument, Cantor does not find Aristotle’s 
rejection of the actual, determinate infinite compelling:
The reasons of the Stagirite prove nothing, however, other 
than  that the arguments  which the ancient natural  philo-
sophers  put  forward  for the  necessary  existence  of a  a
πειρον  φωρισμένον [determinate  infinite] are not compel-
ling; he does not prove, the impossibility of an existing  a
πειρον  φωρισμένον; in other words, he does not prove, that 
the latter concept, when  one conceives of it as a Transfin-
itum, is self-contradictory,  and  it would  be difficult  for 
him, or more  correctly  said, impossible for him  to have 
done so.
26
Given his fundamental  disagreement  with Aristotle on the issue 
of whether  there can be actually infinite magnitudes, it is a curi-
ous fact that Cantor was sympathetic to certain features of Aris-
totle’s theory of the continuum.  In his letter to Paul Tannery of 5 
October 1888, Cantor wrote:
You are right to point out that, I so to speak, renew the Py-
thagorean view, insofar as I teach that the geometrical con-
tinuum  is a real compound  of separate points, geometrical 
individuals, just as a forest is composed  out of trees, but 
because the Pythagoreans understood  the continuum  as a 
sum  of points,  [a view]  which  is powerless  against  the 
demonstrations  [Beweise] of Zeno of Elea, I take the con-
tinuum  to be a point  set (ensemble of points) of a more 
definite, precisely specified nature.
My grasp of the geometrical (and temporal) continuum  
is one which  harmoniously  combines  the  advantages  of 
the Aristotelian view with what is true in the Pythagorean 
way of understanding  [Auffasungsweise], so that there will 
be no Zeno waiting for me who will demonstrate any kind 12 A G J  Newstead
of contradiction  whatsoever  in my  most  well-considered 
[wohlerwogenen] concept of the continuum.
27
Aside from  the historically interesting  fact that Cantor  accepted 
Tannery’s now  discredited  claim that  the target  of Zeno’s para-
doxes was atomism, this passage also suggests that Cantor credits 
the Aristotelian view as having certain advantages which allow it 
to  elude  Zeno’s paradoxes,  advantages  that  he  wishes  to  pre-
serve.
28 The features of Aristotle’s account that I think Cantor ad-
mired  were  Aristotle’s emphasis  on  the  connectedness  of each 
segment of a continuum  with the next, and his insight that there is 
a line between any two points, so that no that no point is immedi-
ately next to another point. We shall see in more detail where the 
agreement between Aristotle and Cantor lies in the next section.
4 Criteria for Continuity
Cantor and modern topologists consider the continuum  to be con-
stituted out of points, a claim which Aristotle tirelessly combats at 
Physics 231a21-37 and  De Generatione et Corruptione 316a1-317b30. 
In the first argument  for this claim, Aristotle argues on the basis 
of his definitions  of contiguity, succession, and  contact, that  no 
point can be contiguous to another, and so not continuous. In the 
second  argument,  Aristotle argues  that nothing  which has mag-
nitude  can be composed  of points which lack magnitude. Cantor 
thought that despite his point-set ontology, he could still preserve 
the basic Aristotelian  insight  into the connectedness  of the con-
tinuum. As we shall see in this section and the next, Cantor would 
agree with the first argument to the extent that he also thinks that 
it is not obvious that the points on a continuum  cannot be ordered  
consecutively.  As  White  has  argued,  Cantor’s  response  to  the 
second argument is to reject the assumption altogether and substi-
tute in its place a conception  of continuity  as an emergent, non-
additive  property.  In this way, a point  set can have  magnitude  
even though none of its points do.
29
In modern  mathematics, the continuum  is defined as any col-
lection of points (or a point-set) possessing a certain structure, a 
structure  that  is exemplified  by, e.g. the collection  of real num-
bers, or the collection of points on a line. According  to Cantor’s 
famous definition, a continuum  is a point set that is both perfect Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
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(dense  in  itself and  closed)  and  well-connected.  He  considers 
these predicates to jointly constitute the necessary and  sufficient 
conditions for being a continuum.
30
Those not familiar with topology, as well as those unacqainted 
with Cantor’s writings, might want to know Cantor’s definitions. 
For both Cantor and modern topologists, a limit point x of a set S is 
a point around  which in any neighbourhood  of x, no matter how 
small, there are points other than  x which belong to S. A neigh-
bourhood  around  a point p is defined as the set of all points with 
some distance less than some arbitrary real number  e from point 
p. In one dimension, the neighbourhood  of p is the interval [p-e, 
p+e], while in two dimensions, it is the set of points in the circular 
disk with centre p and with radius e, and in three dimensions, the 
set of points in the sphere with centre p and radius e. An open set 
is a set all of whose points are interior points, where p is an interi-
or point of S just in case there is some ε > 0 such that if the dis-
tance between p and p’ is less than ε, then p’ is also in S.
A set S is everywhere dense (überall dicht) in an interval (a, b) 
if every  sub-interval  of (a, b), no  matter  how  small,  contains 
points of S. Cantor calls the set of limit points of a set S its derived 
set, which is denoted by S.’ A set S is dense in itself (in sich dicht) if 
every member of it is a limit point, i.e. S ÍS.’ A set S is said to be 
closed (abgeschlossen) if all of its limit points are members of it, S’ 
Í  S. Cantor  defines  a perfect (perfekt) set as one which  is both 
dense in itself and closed. Finally, Cantor defines a set T to be con-
nected (zusammenhängend) if for any two members of the set t and 
t,’ and for any arbitrarily small number  e, there is always a finite 
number of points t, t1, …tn,t’ of T such that the distances t-t1, t1-
t2, t2-t3 … tn-t’ are all less than  e. This definition differs from the 
now  standard  definition  of connectedness, according  to which a 
set is connected just in case it cannot be represented  as the union 
of two non-empty non-overlapping sets.
Cantor  considers  previous  attempts  to define the continuum  
to be lacking in their failure to include one or another of his criter-
ia.
31 This criticism applies to Aristotle’s attempt,  too, since Aris-
totle  emphasises  the  connectedness  of the  continuum  without 
considering its perfection. However, judged according to Cantor’s 
criteria, Aristotle does not fare poorly, anticipating in a clear fash-
ion two out of the three properties Cantor deems essential to con-14 A G J  Newstead
tinua. Aristotle has the concepts of density and connectedness, at 
least in a non-technical sense. It is less clear whether Aristotle has 
the concept of closure. As we shall see, he seems to differentiate 
between  open and  closed intervals of time, but cannot be said to 
have  the concept  of closure  in a general sense, nor to have  the 
concept of a closed interval of space.
Density
The thesis that the points of the continuum  are densely packed is 
implicit in Aristotle’s claim that there is a line between  any two 
points  and  a  stretch  of time  between  any  two  ‘nows’ (Phys. 
231b6). For each line is indefinitely divisible into points, so if there 
is a line between  two points, there are indefinitely many  points 
between the two points. Aristotle defines two things X and Y to be 
successive ( φεξ ς)  just in case X comes after Y, where X and Y are 
of the same type, and there is nothing of the same type as X and Y 
between  X and  Y (Phys.226b35-227a9). It follows  that  entities, 
which are densely arranged,  e.g. points, cannot be successive to 
one another. It may be objected  that it cannot be said that there 
are points between any two points for Aristotle, since points only 
come into (actual) existence for Aristotle when a division is made 
between two line segments. However, such an objection must ex-
plain  what  Aristotle says at  Phys.  231b9: there  is always  a line 
between two points. Of course, for Aristotle, a line is not a collec-
tion of points, so strictly speaking the claim at 231b9 does not im-
ply the points themselves are densely packed. Nonetheless, there is 
a potential infinity of points between  any two points, since one 
can always make a bisection of a line and take the midpoint. This 
potential infinity of points is dense in the requisite sense.
The kind of density Aristotle recognises in the continuum  cor-
responds  to  Cantor’s  notion  of a point  set  being  überall dicht 
(everywhere  dense) in an interval. This is not quite the same as 
the density of a perfect set, which Cantor says is insichdicht (dense 
in itself), a density which a point set possesses just in case every 
point in the set is a limit point. The predicate ‘insichdicht’ pertains 
to the set, while the predicate ‘überall dicht’ denotes a property of 
the set relative to the space in which it is embedded. Although re-
lated the two concepts are clearly not co-extensive. 
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Connectedness
An essential aspect of any theory  of the continuum  is the claim 
that its parts are connected. Intuitively, a set is connected if it con-
tains no gaps. Recall that Cantor defined  a point set T to be con-
nected, if whenever for any two points t and t,’ and for any ε, no 
matter how small, there is always a finite number points t1, t2, …
tk of T, such that each of the successive distances t-t1, t1-t2, t2-t3, 
…tk-t’ is less than ε.
33 So a connected set in this sense can always 
be divided up into a number of segments, the end-points of which 
all belong to the set and can never be very far apart from each oth-
er.
To understand  why a continuum  must be connected, consider 
the pathological case of Cantor’s disconnected  semi-continuum, 
also known as the Cantor set. The Cantor set is formed by remov-
ing successive middle thirds from an interval, starting with [0,1]. 
The first few steps in generating the set are pictured below:
stage 1: 0                                                                                             __    1
stage 2: 0                                             1/3   2/3                         __    1
stage 3: 0         1/9 2/9      1/3  2/3     7/9 8/9___1
The procedure  is ‘performed’  ad infinitum  (a countably  infinite 
number of times!). The Cantor set is the union of all the points that 
remain  when  this operation  is ‘done.’ A moment’s reflection will 
show  that, since we always remove the middle thirds, the points 
remaining in the Cantor set will include points like 1/3, 2/3, 1/9, 
2/9,  7/9,  8/9,  1/27, 2/27  and  so on. So in ternary  notation, the 
points in the Cantor set will include  only those points expressed 
by 0.n1n2n3… where the n’s are 2’s or 0’s, but never 1’s. (A tern-
ary fraction is an expression of form 0.n1n2n3… where n1 repres-
ents the number of thirds, n2 the number of ninths, n3 the number 
of twenty-sevenths, and  in general nk the number  of (1/3 k)ths.) 
Cantor gave the equation for the series of all the points in the Can-
tor set as: C= c1/3  + c2/9 +…cn/3 n +…, where the co-efficients ci 
can take on the value of 0 or 2, and n ranges from 0 to ¥.
34
It is easy to see pictorially that the Cantor set will contain isol-
ated islands of points. But we can also show arithmetically that the 
Cantor  set doesn’t contain  any line segments  at all, because  the 16 A G J  Newstead
sum   of   the   lengths   of   all   of   the   removed   intervals   (1/3+ 
2/9+4/27+…) equals 1. The measure of the Cantor set, like that of 
any collection of disconnected points, is 0. How then can it be that 
there is still something remaining? The continuum  is uncountably 
infinite, but  in removing  segments,  we  have  also  removed  un-
countably  many  points.  Yet the  Cantor  set, like the  continuum  
[0,1], is uncountably infinite. If we wrote an expression in ternary 
notation  for each point  in the Cantor  set, such as.222000222, we 
could show that for each expression, there is a unique decimal ex-
pression  of a number  in the interval  [0,1].
35 So the Cantor  set is 
equipotent with the set of points in the continuum  [0,1].
So clearly uncountable magnitude  does not suffice for being a 
continuum. Nor can being perfect be enough, since the Cantor set 
is perfect. Every point in C is a limit point of C, since around  any 
point in C there are other points belonging to C. Yet the Cantor set 
fails to be a continuum  because it is not connected and not every-
where dense in the interval [0,1]. It is not connected, obviously, be-
cause there are huge gaps between consecutive segments in the in-
terval, between 1/3 and 2/3 for example. For the same reason it is 
not everywhere dense in the interval.
The fractal pioneer  Benoit Mandelbrot  called  the Cantor  set 
‘the dust set’ in his book The Fractal Geometry of Nature.
36 It is inter-
esting to note that Aristotle, too, imagines a magnitude  that is di-
vided through and through (ad infinitum) to resemble saw dust:
But suppose that as the body is being divided, something 
like sawdust  [ πρισμα] is produced, and that in this sense 
a body  comes away  from  the magnitude,  even  then  the 
same argument applies…[that] it is absurd  that magnitude 
should   consist   of   things   which   are   not   magnitudes 
(Joachim, GC 316b1-5).
Aristotle even goes some way towards explaining why a dust set 
is not a continuum.  For he realises that  there can be no contact 
between  two  points, since the points  being  indivisible, lack ex-
tremities:   “And   every   contact   is   always   a   contact   of   two 
somethings, i.e. there is always something  besides the contact or 
division or the point (GC 316a6).”
37 So it would  not be wholly in-
accurate to say that Aristotle’s insight is shared by Cantor and in-
stituted in the latter’s requirement that a continuum  be connected.Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
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According to Aristotle the parts of a continuum  must be such 
that their extremities are not only touching but identical:
…things are called continuous  (συνεχ )  when  the touching 
limits of each become one and  the same  and  are, as the 
word implies, contained in each other (συνέχηται): continu-
ity is impossible if the extremeties are two. This definition 
makes it plain that continuity belongs to things that natur-
ally in virtue of their mutual contact (σύναψιν) form a unity 
(Phys., 227a10ff.).
Whereas for connectedness Cantor requires that we be able to di-
vide up the continuum  into a finite number of segments such that 
the distance between  adjacent  segments  approaches  0, Aristotle 
requires  that  the  distance  between  two  ‘consecutive’ parts  of a 
continuum  be zero. A line with its midpoint  removed  could  not 
be continous for Aristotle, but it does count as connected for Can-
tor. However,  it is not  a continuum  for Cantor,  since it is not 
closed and dense in itself.
To be sure, Aristotle has already  established  that consecutive 
parts of the continuum  cannot be points, because points are dense 
in the continuum.  Aristotle’s requirement  creates a problem  for 
the point-set concept  of the continuum.  Since points are indivis-
ible and  of zero magnitude,  they have no extremities and  there-
fore it is not possible for them to be distinct if their extremities are 
one. Hence, the attempt  to string  together  points in such a way 
that their limits are one will have the absurd  consequence that all 
of the points will coincide with one another, and  a single exten-
sionless point will be left. This sort of consideration may underlie 
Aristotle’s claim that any attempt to construct a continuum  out of 
points  will amount  to nothing  (GC 316a30-5). The lesson  to be 
learned from the Cantor set, and from Aristotle’s ‘sawdust’ is that 
it is not enough  to have a collection of uncountably many points 
to form  a continuum.  In addition,  the  set must  have  a certain 
structure: it must be connected, dense and closed.
Closure
So far we have seen that Aristotle’s criteria for continuity include 
both density and connectedness. This leaves closure, the other as-
pect of perfection. Without  this concept,  we  cannot  distinguish 18 A G J  Newstead
between  the rational  numbers  which  are dense, but  not closed, 
and the reals, which are closed. Does Aristotle have the topologic-
al concept of an open as opposed  to closed interval? Some Aris-
totelian scholars, such as Michael White, think that Aristotle lacks 
this distinction and  that the lack of this distinction prevents him 
from  offering  a satisfactory  (i.e. mathematically  acceptable) ac-
count of the continuum. Other Aristotelian scholars, notably Dav-
id Bostock, argue  that  Aristotle does  distinguish  between  open 
and  closed  intervals, at least sometimes. It seems to me that the 
preponderance of evidence supports Bostock’s conclusion.
First, the evidence in favour  of the hypothesis that  Aristotle 
lacks the  distinction  between  closed  and  open  intervals. White 
cites Aristotle’s explanation of why time, though potentially divis-
ible into infinitely many nows, can nonetheless elapse at Physics 
263a23ff. A key feature  of the explanation  is that  we  must  not 
think of a movement as divided into infinitely many actual points, 
rather than as potentially divisible ad infinitum. According to Aris-
totle,
… anyone who divides a continuous line into two halves is 
treating  the single point  at which  the division  occurs  as 
two points, because he is making  it both a starting  point 
and an ending point; and counting out halves is no differ-
ent from dividing into halves. But to make these divisions 
is to destroy  the continuity  of movement  as well as the 
line, because  continuous  movement  is movement  over  a 
continuum,  and although  there are infinitely many halves 
in any continuum,  these are potential, not actual. Any ac-
tual  division  puts  an  end  to continuous  movement  and 
creates a standstill (Phys. 263a23ff., Waterfield, emphasis 
mine).
According  to  White  (1992), the  explanation  for  why  Aristotle 
thinks  it is obvious  that  dividing  a line into  two  segments  in-
volves treating  one point as two, is that he cannot  imagine that 
the point could be assigned to one interval only, with the other in-
terval being left open. Since Aristotle tends  to think  in terms  of 
magnitude,  White argues, there  would  be no reason  for him  to 
distinguish  between  [0,1) and  [0,1]. As Aristotle knew,  a point 
does not have magnitude, so subtracting a point from an interval 
does not alter its magnitude.
38 In fact Aristotle makes the stronger Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
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claim elsewhere that any mere (disconnected) collection of points 
cannot add up to a positive magnitude (GC 316a30.).
Now for the evidence against the hypothesis. The evidence in 
favour  of the  hypothesis  is drawn  entirely  from  Aristotle’s re-
marks  on  movement  and  spatial  extension  it seems.  But Aris-
totle’s remarks on temporal extension in the context of his discus-
sion of change may suggest that he does take into account  open 
intervals.
39 For Aristotle thinks  that  there  is no first moment  of 
change, but there is a time by which the change is completed. So if 
the stretch of time it takes for a change to occur is conceived of as 
an interval, it will be open on one end and closed on the other. In 
his article, ‘Aristotle on Continuity in Physics VI,’ David Bostock 
notes that
One might claim that Aristotle himself may be said to re-
cognize the existence of such things as half-open intervals 
at Phys. VIII.8 263b9-264a6, where he perceptively remarks 
that an interval without its end-point is no shorter than the 
interval with its end-point (264a4-6).
Following up  this clue does indeed  suggest that Aristotle distin-
guishes between open and closed intervals in time. Aristotle dis-
cusses the case of an object D changing from white to non-white 
during  the time interval ACD. During the entire interval of time 
from A to C, the object is white, and during the interval from C to 
D it is not white. In order  to avoid  the paradox  that  D is both 
white and non-white at C, Aristotle says
The solution is not to grant  that it is white for the whole 
stretch  of time, but  to say that  it is white  for the whole 
stretch  of time except  the final now, namely  C, which is 
already part of the later stretch of time. (Phys. 263b20).
Here we have the half open interval [A, C). Moreover,
..it is clear that  if time A as a whole  is the time  during 
which it was becoming white, the time in which it was be-
coming white and  became white [A,C] is no greater than 
all the time in which it was becoming white [A,C). (Phys. 
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So here Aristotle recognises that the magnitude  of the half-open 
interval  [A, C) is no greater  than  that  of the closed  interval  [A, 
C].
40
But Aristotle appears to only talk of open-intervals with refer-
ence to stretches of time, not stretches of space. This introduces an 
asymmetry  into the account of space and time. So we should  not 
take Miller’s isomorphism  thesis to imply that intervals of space 
and  time are exactly alike. The isomorphism  thesis will still be 
valid insofar as both space and time are continua for Aristotle, but 
it will no longer be true that stretches of space and time have the 
same topological structure.
Well-Ordering and the Continuum
In an  eminently  sensible  passage,  Aristotle  argues  that  a con-
tinuum  cannot be constituted out of points, since a continuum  has 
magnitude,  whereas  points  (as ultimate  indivisibles) lack mag-
nitude. Aristotle’s analysis of the problem is worth quoting in full:
For, since no point  is contiguous  to another  point, mag-
nitudes  are divisible through  and  through  in one sense, 
and yet not in another. When, however, it is admitted  that 
a magnitude is divisible through and through in one sense, 
it is thought  that  there is a point  not only  anywhere, but 
also  everywhere, in it: hence it follows that the magnitude  
must  be divided  away  into nothing. For there is a point 
everywhere  within  it, so that it consists either of contacts 
or points. But it is only in one sense that magnitude is divis-
ible through and through; viz. insofar as there is one point 
anywhere  within  it and  all of its points  are everywhere 
within  it if you take them  singly. But there are not more 
points than  one  anywhere within  it, for the points are not 
consecutive; hence, it is not divisible through and through. 
For if it were, then,….if it be divisible at its centre, it will 
be divisible also at a contiguous  point. But it is not so di-
visible; for position is not contiguous to position, nor point 
to point (GC 317a2-10, Joachim translation).
In this section, I will suggest a novel and  somewhat  speculative 
reconstruction  of this argument.  I should  note, before doing  so, 
however,  that  Aristotle’s argument  is rejected  by Cantor,  who Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
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does think that some collections of points can be continua. A ma-
jor difference between the Aristotelian and Cantorian conceptions 
here, is that, for Cantor the measure of a set may be non-additive, 
‘emergent  property,’ whereas for Aristotle the sum  of the whole 
must equal the sum  of each of its parts.
41 I suggest that the tech-
nical reason  why  Aristotle  could  not  have  conceived  of a con-
tinuum  as being constituted  out of points was that he lacked the 
sophisticated  apparatus  of point  set  theory.  Aristotle  was,  of 
course, philosophically opposed to the idea of an infinite number. 
But given his respect for the use of mathematics in laying the con-
ceptual foundations of scientific theory, we cannot help but won-
der what Aristotle would have made of transfinite numbers. What 
follows is just such an imaginative exercise.
For  Aristotle,  all  numbers  are  determinate  and  countable. 
Consequently the idea of an uncountably infinite number  would 
have struck him as an oxymoron. However, since Cantor, modern 
mathematicians take a different view of countability. Countability 
is only a feature  of one portion  of the universe of numbers, the 
natural numbers. The more basic fact is that sets that are compar-
able with regard to cardinality can be well-ordered. A set A can be 
well ordered  if it is possible to define a relation  R on the set A 
such that R constitutes a linear ordering of the set A and for every 
member  of a non-empty  subset of A, there is an R minimal ele-
ment, a first element to bear R to something else. Cantor drew at-
tention to the well-ordering principle in his Grundlagen, calling it 
‘a basic law of thought.’
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Is there any sense in which  we can say that Aristotle recog-
nised  that the continuum  was uncountably  infinite? To say that 
the continuum  is  uncountably infinite for Aristotle (or a modern  
Aristotelian) would  be to allude to the fact that it is always pos-
sible to make an additional  division  in a continuum.  Any point 
can be numbered, but there are countlessly many potential points 
on the continuum.  At no time will all of the points be numbered. 
For modern  mathematicians, to call a set ‘uncountable’ is just to 
say that its members cannot be put in one to one correspondence 
with the natural numbers. If we consider the act of counting to be 
like that of making a division, then the two notions of countability 
might  seem  analogous.  However,  an  Aristotelian  notion  of un-
countability  is meant  to  connote  the  indeterminate  number  of 
points that lie ready to be made in a continuum. The mathematic-22 A G J  Newstead
al notion of uncountability carries with it no such connotation of 
indeterminacy. Cantor did  recognise a kind  of uncountability  in 
the extended sense of not being well-orderable. Counting  depends 
on the possibility of arranging things in order. So it might be said 
that there is an analogy between  uncountability in the extended  
sense and  uncountability in the Aristotelian sense of being inde-
terminately, or potentially, infinite. Such an analogy proves useful 
in interpreting Aristotle’s argument for the impossibility of divid-
ing a continuum  through and through at GC 316a24-34.
A good  basic analysis  of the  passage  is given  by  William 
Charlton in ‘Aristotle’s Potential Infinites.’
43 Charlton’s analysis is 
that Aristotle is drawing a distinction of scope in a universal mod-
al claim. Thus Aristotle is affirming the proposition (1) For all x, 
it’s possible to divide  body  b at point x, while denying  the pro-
position (2) It’s possible that a body is divided at every point x for 
all x. This interpretation  makes  good  sense  of Aristotle’s claim 
that ‘it is only in one sense that the magnitude is divisible through 
and  through,  viz. only  insofar  as there  is one  point  anywhere 
within it.’ It also explains why each point can be actualised indi-
vidually, even though  the infinite collection cannot be actualised 
at once, en masse.
However, this interpretation neglects the other aspect of Aris-
totle’s explanation, i.e. his mention of the non-contiguity of points 
in the continuum, and subsequent inference that this prevents the 
continuum  from being divided through and through. At 317a9-10, 
Aristotle recognises the need for an ordering procedure for count-
ing or dividing  things. We know  from Phys. 262a21 that a point 
on a line is not considered  to be actual for Aristotle unless an ob-
ject comes to rest there, dividing the path of its journey into two. 
We might also suppose that counting is another way to actualise 
something. This hypothesis yields the desired result that there can 
be no actually infinite number for Aristotle, since then the infinite 
would  be countable, and  what is more, actual. In the case of the 
continuum  where no point is immediately next to another given 
point,  there  is no  constructive  means  for  ordering  the  points. 
Hence, the points are uncountable in the extended sense and there 
is thus no way in which the process of division can deliver the to-
tality  of points  produced  by  each  possible  division,  rendering 
them uncountable in the sense we defined for Aristotle.Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the 
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There is, of course, a non-constructive means of imposing or-
der on the continuum: by applying the Axiom of Choice, we can 
arbitrarily select a first element  from every non-empty  subset of 
the continuum.
44 But the Axiom is unjustified from the construct-
ive point of view, because it does not give a rule for selecting the 
chosen elements. Moreover, it is especially disturbing to a finitist, 
because it licenses the inference that we can perform  these infin-
itely many choices simultaneously.
For Aristotle, it is non-sensical to conjure up an actually infin-
ite set out of nothing, out of a mere collection of points. In this re-
spect, Aristotle is closer to Brouwer than Cantor. The continuum  
as a whole exists, but the termini of intervals within it, the points, 
are only realised in time as the thinker or mathematician performs 
a certain act, such as counting  or dividing  intervals into ‘before’ 
and ‘after.’ There are affinities here between Aristotle’s insistence 
that  there  must  be a soul  to count  the  passage  of time  (Phys. 
223a21-28), and  Brouwer’s notion  that  the structure  of the con-
tinuum  is given in the intuition of time. Since time is potentially 
infinite, it forever  grows  in the  direction  of the  future,  and  so 
there will never be a time at which all of its moments exist simul-
taneously. Thus far Aristotle and Brouwer are in agreement that a 
potential infinity is as Brouwer  would  say, ‘denumerably  unfin-
ished’ or incomplete. Despite the frequency with which the com-
parison between Aristotelian and intuitionistic theories of the con-
tinuum  is casually  proposed,  it is seldom  carried  out  in detail, 
perhaps  because  there is a significant  disanalogy  between  Aris-
totle’s approach, with  its coupling  of classical logic, abstraction-
ism, and  finitism  about  the universe,  and  Brouwer’s approach, 
with its epistemic and proof-theoretic reasons for rejecting infinite 
totalities. Moreover, although  a good deal of mathematics of the 
continuum  can be reconstructed  using intuitionism, intuitionistic 
mathematics is plainly not adequate to capture all of contempor-
ary mathematical practice, a goal which was still feasible for Aris-
totelian mathematics (see Phys. 207b27-34). There is thus a sense 
in which Aristotle’s philosophy  of mathematics is more success-
fully conservative  of mathematical practice. For such  reasons, a 
comparison with Brouwer is especially difficult.
Cantor, in contrast  to Aristotle, proceeded  from  the concep-
tion that the continuum  and  all of its uncountably  many  points 
already exist in actuality prior to the activity of the human  math-24 A G J  Newstead
ematician. This conception legitimates many of Cantor’s non-con-
structivist claims. Yet despite their different metaphysics, there is 
a substantial area of agreement  between  Cantor and  Aristotle as 
to the topological nature of the continuum.  Cantor upholds Aris-
totle’s insight  insofar as he too insists that  a mere  collection  of 
points, no matter  how  many,  cannot  in themselves  constitute  a 
continuum.  The collection must have a specific structure: it must 
be connected, dense, and  closed. Of these three criteria, Aristotle 
already singles out two as essential to continua, and shows some 
understanding  of the third (at least for the case of time-intervals). 
What might account for the remarkable similarity in these theor-
ies of the continuum? I believe, even though  Cantor would  reject 
such an explanation, that the similarity is best explained by taking 
a leaf out  of Aristotle’s philosophy  of mathematics. Cantor  and 
Aristotle share  a common  intuition  of the structure  of the con-
tinuum,  an intuition  that has its source in the experience of the 
physical world.
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